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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE| STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES R. HOWLAND/ 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Cage No. 860331-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE C^SE 
This appeal is from a judgment against James Ronald Howland 
for Attempted Aggravated Assault/ a Class A Misdemeanor/ in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 and $76-4-11)1 (1953 as 
amended). See Addendum A. A jury found Mif*. Howland guilty 
following a trial on October 9th / 19b0, in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah/ the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson/ Judge presiding. The Court sentenced Mr. Howland to 
serve 12 months in the Salt Lake County Jail and pay a fine of two 
thousand five hundred dollars. The Court stayed the twelve month 
jail sentence and placed Mr. Howland on probation for a period of 
one year. Pursuant to the terms of such probation/ the Court 
required Mr. Howland to serve six months in the county jail and 
complete other terms and conditions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of July 6, 1986 at approximately 10:00 p.m./ 
an altercation took place between Daniel Wlayne Elliston/ a shift 
manager at the McDonalds fast food franchise located at 700 East and 
200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the appellant, James R. 
Howland. At the time of the incident, Mr. Elliston had worked at 
McDonalds for n year and a half, earning four dollars an hour (R. 
155, 159). He testified at trial that his duties included assuring 
that company safety and security standards were met (R. 155). 
Specifically, he disclosed that the company employs a policy of 
holding food for only ten minutes after it is prepared, and throwing 
all food away if it is not sold within ten minutes (R. 155, 159). 
Mr. Elliston indicated that the disposal of food after ten minutes 
was prompted by health and sanitary concerns since after that ten 
minute period, the food would "start getting diseases on it" (R. 
155, 159). Food that is thrown away is taken to the trash dumpster, 
known as "the corral", immediately behind the restaurant. The 
corral is a brick enclosed area, large in size, containing a 
dumpster accessible from a gate across the front and an open 
entrance on the side (R. 156-58). 
The brick corral is posted with a sign which reads, 
"Warning. Garbage in the dumpster is contaminated. Keep Out." (R. 
157-58). Mr. Elliston testified that the purpose of the sign is to 
prevent garbage from being taken out of the dumpster (R. 159). 
One of Mr. Elliston's duties was to make a security check 
approximately once every hour of both the inside and outside of the 
store including the corral area (R. 162, 197). Mr. Elliston 
testified that during these security checks, it is a common 
occurrence that there are persons in the corral at the dumpster. He 
stated, "one in four times I go out to the corral I have to kick 
somebody out of the corral" (R. 197). He added, "There is [sic] a 
lot of transients in the area" (R. 197). 
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Mr. Howland, the appellant, is a tiransient. At one point 
during his testimony he characterized his lifestyle as "living on 
the streets, skid row, , Salvation Armjf, the Rescue Mission, the 
Men's Shelter, Pioneer Park" (R. 272-73). Mr. Howland was aware of 
McDonalds' policy of throwing food in the dumpster, and he testified 
that "McDonalds is far more wasteful than most other fast food 
restaurants" (R. 289). 
On July 6, 1986, around 10:00 p.m., Mr. Howland was in the 
dumpster area behind the McDonalds on 700 East and 200 South (R. 
287). He testified that he was attempting to get a plastic bag full 
of refuse out of the dumpster, hoping to retrieve some food. 
Mr. Elliston, along with a second employee, made a security 
check around 10:00 p.m. that same night (R^  160). As Elliston 
entered the corral area, he saw Mr. Howland trying to hide by the 
back of the dumpster (R. 162, 165). Mr. EjLliston instructed Mr. 
Howland to leave (R. 164). Mr. Howland responded that Mr. Elliston 
did not have "any right to tell him to get out of there" (R. 164). 
Mr. Elliston asked and instructed Mr. Howlknd to leave four or five 
times before he finally complied (R. 289). Mr. Howland testified 
that Mr. Elliston had to ask him that many times because he was 
irritated over so much wasted food being tlhrown away (R. 289-90). 
Both men accused the other of beimg belligerent in the 
conversation IR, IbS-66, 262-63). As they left the corral area, Mr. 
Howland checked the name tag of Mr. Elliston and asked him if he had 
a family (R. 166, 263) At this juncture, the stories diverge. Mr. 
Elliston claims that Mr. Howland threatened to kill his family, 
stating that Mr. Howland's words were, "I am going to find your 
house and kill your family." (R. 166, 225). Mr. Elliston then 
testified that Mr. Howland "came back like he was going to hit me, 
and so I hit him" (R. 167). Mr. Elliston testified that he hit Mr. 
Howland before Mr. Howland could hit him and that he hit Mr. Howland 
four or five times in the face, but Mr. Howland never landed a blow 
as Mr. Elliston blocked all attempts (R. 183-84). According to Mr. 
Elliston, while he was hitting Mr. Howland, he was telling Mr. 
Howland that he was placing him under citizen's arrest (R. 187). 
Mr. Howland then ran in the direction of the Smith's Food King 
approximately two hundred and fifty feet away (R. 167-68). 
Mr. Howland testified that he never threatened Mr. Elliston 
(R. 295). Mr. Howland stated that he merely gave him advice about 
talking to people politely and not being so rude and insulting 
because it would get him into serious trouble some day (R. 291-93). 
Mr. Howland testified that Mr. Elliston had misinterpreted what he 
had said to be a threat (R. 292-93). 
Mr. Howland testified he did not make a gesture to strike 
Mr. Elliston and that he ducked away from Mr. Elliston after 
Elliston hit him several times and then Howland walked away at a 
fast walk (R. 267). Mr. Howland stated that after he got twenty 
feet away, he and Mr. Elliston exchanged words; Mr. Howland laughed 
at Mr. Elliston, who then chased Howland in a threatening manner (R. 
267-68). 
Mr. Elliston's testimony also indicates that Mr. Howland 
had "a twenty foot head start" before he chased him (R. 189). Mr. 
Elliston caught up with Mr. Howland in front of the Smith's Food 
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King door where Mr. Elliston grabbed Mr. Hokland from behind, 
wrestled him to the ground, and placed him in a headlock (R. 190-92). 
Robert Kilburn arrived at the Smith Food King parking lot 
and observed the wrestling (R. 200). He ap|proached the two when Mr. 
Elliston was on top of Mr. Howland holding Ihim in a headlock (R. 
202). Mr. Kilburn testified that Mr. Howlaind had his hand on the 
handle of the hunting knife and had pulled it approximately five 
inches out of the sheath (R. 217-18). He testified there was no 
stabbing motion or lunging (R. 218). Mr. Rowland testified that he 
did not take the knife out of its sheath. Instead, he had his hand 
on the knife while it was still in the sheath because he was worried 
that Elliston would grab the knife and use it against him. When 
Kilburn grabbed Howland's hand, he pulled Rowland's arm and the 
knife came out of the sheath (R. 270-272). 
After grabbing Howland's arm, Mr. Kilburn placed his knee 
in Mr. Howland's stomach and squeezed Howland's wrist until he 
dropped the knife (R. 214-18). Mr. Kilburn gave the knife to the 
Smith's Food King Manager (R. 218). Mr. Elliston continued to hold 
Mr. Howland in a headlock until police arrived (R. 190). 
The police took Mr. Howland into Custody and charged him 
with aggravated assault. Through his counsel, Mr. Howland moved for 
the charges to be dismissed (R. 108) (Addendum B). The Court took 
the motion under advisement and later denied it (R. 135). 
the close of the state's case, defense counsel moved the 
Court to dismiss the charges, arguing that the state failed to 
present a prima facie case (R. 242). The (pourt denied the motion 
(R. 245-46). 
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Defense counsel moved that Mr. Howland's prior convictions 
be excluded from evidence according to Rule 609(a) (R. 246). The 
Court denied the motion (R. 256). The trial court, however, did 
exclude prior convictions of Mr. Elliston over objection of counsel 
(R. 282-83). The Court instructed the jury as to flight by a 
defendant after the commission of a crime. Defense counsel objected 
to such instruction (R. 337). 
The jury returned from deliberations with a guilty verdict 
on the lesser included offense of attempted aggravated assault (R. 
338). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On appeal Appellant, James R. Howland first contends that 
the trial court erroneously denied Mr. Howland's pre-trial motion to 
dismiss the charges against him. Mr. Elliston claimed to effect a 
citizen arrest of Mr. Howland but did not have probable cause to do 
so. 
Mr. Howland next alleges that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in denying his motion to exclude prior convictions 
and subsequently excluding the prior convictions of Mr. Elliston, 
the state's primary witness. The trial court erred in applying Rule 
609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and moreover was inconsistent 
in applying the rule. 
Mr. Howland also claims the trial court erred in failing to 
dismiss the charge of aggravated assault in that the State had 
failed to establish the elements of the charge. 
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In addition, Mr. Howland contends that the trial court 
committed reversible error in instructing the jury regarding flight 
after the commission of an offense in that the evidence did not show 
that a flight occurred after the commission of the crime and the 
content of the instruction was faulty since it did not discuss two 
important areas regarding flight. 
Finally, Mr. Howland contends that the cumulative effect of 
the errors at trial denied him his right to a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
MR. HOWLANDfS PRE-TRIAL 
Prior to trial, Mr. Howland filed 
charge against him (R. 108). See Addendum 
motion under advisement and later denied it (R. 135). 
Mr. Howland asserts that Mr. Ellis 
manager, possessed no probable cause to eff 
over him. As the arrest was attempted with 
Howland was within his rights to resist an 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
a motion to dismiss the 
B. The Court took the 
alternative, Mr. Howland contends that if Mr. Elliston did have 
probable cause, he only had probable cause to believe he had 
committed a trespass, an infraction on these facts. An infraction 
does not warrant incarceration as indicated in Utah Codf Ann. 
§76-3-205; therefore, it is unreasonable t6 arrest an infraction 
violator. Accordingly, Mr. Howland requests this Court to reverse 
the decision of the trial court. 
ton, a McDonalds shift 
ect a citizen's arrest 
out probable cause, Mr. 
unlawful arrest. In the 
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A. MR. ELLISTON DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO ARREST MR. HOWLAND FOR ANY CRIME. 
At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Elliston articulated the 
possible bases for the claimed citizen's arrest. He testified that 
he was attempting to place Mr. Howland under citizen's arrest for 
the crimes of malicious mischief, threats against his family and 
perhaps trespass (R. 113). 
The criminal mischief statute is found in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-106 and is inapplicable to the facts in this case. 
Section 76-6-106 provides in pertinent part: 
76-6-106. Criminal mischief.—(1) A person 
commits criminal mischief if: 
(a) Under circumstances not amounting to arson, 
he damages or destroys property with the 
intention of defrauding an insurer; or 
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully tampers with 
the property of another and thereby: 
(i) Recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) Recklessly causes or threatens a substantial 
interruption or impairment of any public utility 
service; or 
(c) He intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the 
property of another. 
(d) He recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile 
or other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, 
airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car or caboose, 
whether moving or standing. 
The facts in this case do not fit within any of the provisions of 
§76-6-106 since Mr. Howland did not intentionally tamper with, 
destroy or damage property as proscribed in the statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-107 criminalizes the use of 
terroristic threats. That section provides in pertinent part: 
76-5-107. Terroristic threat. (1) A person 
commits terroristic threat if he threatens to 
commit any offense involving violence with intent: 
(a) To cause action of any sort by an official 
or volunteer agency organized to deal with 
emergencies; or 
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(b) To place a person in fear of [imminent 
serious bodily injury; or 
(c) To prevent or interrupt the occupation of a 
building, room; place of assembly; 
the public has access; or aircraft| 
or other form of conveyance. 
place to which 
, automobile, 
Subsections 1(a) and 1(c) are inapplicable to the facts in 
the present case. Subsection Kb) provides 
terroristic threat if he threatens to commi 
violence with intent to place a person in fl 
bodily injury. According to the state's wi| 
that a person commits a 
t any offense involving 
ear of imminent serious 
tnesses, Mr. Howland 
threatened to kill Mr. Elliston's family.1 (R. 112, 166 ,, II r 
188, 225). 
Since the threat was of future haifm, the family was not 
present at the time the statement was madej and Mr. Howland did not 
know where they were (R. 45-46), Mr. Elliston could not have had the 
requisite fear of imminent serious bodily injury as required by the 
terroristic threat statute. Accordingly, this statute could not 
have been used to justify the arrest of Mrj Howland by citizen 
Elliston. 
1
 At the pretrial motion hearing, the prosecutor clarified Mr. 
Elliston's preliminary hearing testimony regarding the threat. The 
prosecutor stated "I will kill your family 
. . . Those are the words I wrote down at the preliminary hearing 
and they are not vague. They were exactly)those words" (R. 112) At 
trial, after the parties argued the motion to dismiss, Elliston 
testified that Howland threatened both him and his family. However, 
when asked by the prosecutor to clarify the exact words used, 
Elliston acknowledged that Howland had threatened to kill only the 
family (R. 166-7). See also R. 171, 188. Mr. Hervey, a McDonalds 
employee who witnessed a portion of the altercation between Elliston 
and Howland, testified that Howland said "J am going to qet your 
family" (R. 225). 
The third theory utilized to support the citizen arrest is 
trespass which is found in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206. Depending on 
the factual context of the alleged trespass, the actions of the 
trespassor may be categorized as either a Class B misdemeanor, a 
Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction. Subsection (2Mb) is the 
only possibility that applies to the facts in the present case. It 
provides that: 
knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice 
against entering is given by: (i) personal 
communication to the actor by the owner or 
someone with apparent authority to act for the 
owner; or (ii) fencing or other enclosure 
obviously designed to exclude intruders; or (iii) 
posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the 
attention of intruders. 
Subsection point (3) indicates, however, that a violation of (2)(b) 
is an infraction. Thus, the only possible violation committed by 
Mr. Howland at the dumpster was an infraction trespass. 
B. ARRESTING AN INDIVIDUAL FOR AN INFRACTION 
CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE SEIZURE AND IS 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
An individual convicted of an infraction may not be 
imprisoned, but may be subject to fine, forfeiture, disqualification 
or any combination as part of a sentence for committing an 
infraction. See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-205 (1953 as amended). While 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-205 does not specifically state that an 
individual suspected of committing an infraction cannot be arrested, 
such an interpretation is reasonable in light of public policies, 
the language of the statute, the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution. 
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An arrest is a seizure of the persbn (Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). Permitting a person to 
liberty restrained when that same liberty c| 
ultimately convicted is unreasonable and vi 
in the Utah and United States Constitutions 
individual against unreasonable seizures of| 
In State v. Klinker, 537 P.2d 268 
was arrested for <j civil paternity claim* 
an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment siri 
to arrest someone for a civil matter. 
Although an infraction is distinguishable from a civil 
paternity action, jail is not a permissible punishment in either 
circumstance and, therefore, the holding in Klinker that an arrest 
violates the Fourth Amendment extends to this situation. 
In a concurring opinion in Gustafgon v. Florida, 414 U.S. 
be arrested and have his 
annot be restrained if 
plative of the provisions 
which protect an 
the person. 
(Wash. 1975), a person 
The court held that such 
ce it was not reasonable 
260 (1973)(Stewart, J. concurring), the late Justice Stewart 
suggests that the defendant in the case might have made a persuasive 
claim that a custodial arrest on a minor traffic offense violated 
the defendant's rights under the Fourth ancfl Fourteenth Amendments. 
Finally, in Allen v. Burke, 690 F|2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), 
the circuit court discussed whether a magistrate could be held 
liable for attorney fees in a civil rights 
court did not question but rather accepted 
premise from the district court who had declared as unconstitutional 
the practice of incarcerating persons for i(ion-incarcerable offenses. 
In State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527 
held that as a matter of public police cusj 
action. The circuit 
the basic underlying 
(Wash. 1978), the court 
podial arrest for minor 
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traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if 
the defendant signs the promise to appear. While the factual 
circumstances are admittedly distinct from the case at bar, the 
basic premise is applicable to both contexts. A violation of public 
policy occurs when someone is arrested and taken into custody on an 
offense for which the punishment for that offense would not allow 
imprisonment. 
In the present case, where Mr. Howland did not commit a 
jailable offense at the dumpster, any attempt by Mr. Elliston to 
arrest him was unlawful. 
C. APPELLANT HAD A RIGHT TO RESIST THE UNLAWFUL 
CITIZEN ARREST. 
As previously outlined, the action taken by Mr. Elliston 
after Mr. Howland withdrew from the dumpster area and retreated from 
the scene of the initial altercation was unlawful. An angry Mr. 
Elliston pursued Mr. Howland, grabbed him from behind, wrestled him 
to the ground and placed him in a headlock so that Mr. Howland could 
not move (R. 190, 192). Elliston told Howland he was placing him 
under arrest, but such an arrest was unlawful since Howland had not 
committed a jailable offense. 
In State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a statute which made a person guilty of 
interfering with a police officer if they resisted an arrest, 
whether it was lawful or not, was unconstitutional. From that 
action one may infer that it is lawful to resist an unlawful 
arrest. The replacement statute to the one held unconstitutional, 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305, now limits the interference with a police 
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officer to only those situations where the factor has knowledgef or 
should know, that the police officer is seejking to effect a lawful 
arrest. (See Addendum C). 
If a person may resist a police officer's unlawful arrest, 
resisiting an unlawful citizen's arrest also seems permissible. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Howland's 
pre-trial motion to dismiss. This Court should therefore reverse 
the subsequent conviction of Mr. Howland and remand the case to the 
trial court to dismiss the charges. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY DENYING MR. HOWLAND'S MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND 
BY EXCLUDING PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF THE 
MCDONALDS EMPLOYEE, MRj. ELLISTON. 
Before testifying, Mr. Howland moved the trial court to 
exclude his prior convictions (R. 246). Mr. Howland's prior record 
included a 1976 conviction for attempted robbery, a third degree 
felony and a 1976 conviction for attempted burglary, also a third 
degree felony (R. 247). The trial court denied the motion and 
allowed both convictions into evidence (R. 
contends that the denial of the motion to 
256). Mr. Howland now 
[exclude evidence of prior 
convictions constituted reversible error fc^y the trial court because 
the prior convictions were neither more probative than prejudicial, 
nor did they involve dishonesty or false Statements as required by 
Rule 609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 609(a) provides: 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction 
of crime. 
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(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted 
if elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross-examination but only if the 
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year under the law which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
In presenting her motion, defense counsel contended, under 
subsection (a)(1), that Mr. Howland's prior convictions would be 
more prejudicial than probative and that the court should therefore 
exclude them (R. 246-50). The State, however, argued that balancing 
under Subsection (a)(1) was not required because Mr. Howland's 
convictions were admissible under the subsection (a)(2) since they 
were crimes involving dishonesty and false statements (R. 250-53). 
While the trial court was not clear in its ruling as to which 
subsection it relied on in admitting the convictions, the record 
suggests that the court denied the motion based on subsection 
(a)(2). This conclusion is reached in part because the trial court 
cited State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), which discussed the 
dishonesty and false statements theory (R. 278-79). 
Regardless of which 609(a) theory the trial court used to 
admit the prior convictions, the Court committed reversible error 
since neither subsection (a)(1) nor subsection (a)(2), allows the 
admission of Mr. Howland's two 1976 convictions. 
A. MR. HOWLAND'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE NOT CRIMES 
WHICH WERE MORE PROBATIVE THAN PREJUDICIAL AS 
REQUIRED BY RULE 609(a)(1). 
Rule 609(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows prior 
convictions to be admissible as evidence to attack the credibility 
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of a witness if elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross examination only if the crime is a felony and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. State v. Banner/ 
717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), is the lead case on Rule 609(a)(1) and it 
lays out five factors which are to be considered when balancing 
probative value against prejudicial effect. The five factors are: 
[1] the nature of the crime, as Hearing on the character 
for veracity of the witness. 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction 
[3] the similarity of the prior cfrime to the charged 
crime, insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to 
punish the accused as a bad person. 
[4] the importance of credibility issues in determining 
the truth in a prosecution tried without decisive 
nontestimonial evidence . . . 
[5] the importance of the accused's testimony as perhaps 
warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of the 
accused's character for veracity 1 . . 
Banner, supra at 1334. 
Mr. Howland's prior convictions, attempted robbery and 
attempted burglary, do not bear on the character for veracity of the 
witness any more than the crime of assault 
rape did in Banner. There the Utah Supreme Court stated that the 
crime in question "sheds about the same li 
involving moral turpitude." Banner, supra 
with intent to commit 
said of Mr. Howland's prior convictions, 
nor attempted burglary inherently reflect 
lie. Both crimes involve taking something! 
pht as any felony 
at 1335. The same can be 
(Neither attempted robbery 
on a predisposition to 
not your own but have 
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expressly been ruled out as probative of an accused's character for 
veracity* (See Argument Point II* B., infra,) 
Mr. Howland's prior convictions were both received in 1976, 
roughly ten years from when he went to trial on the charge at issue 
in this appeal. The previous convictions in the Banner case were 
eight and nine years prior to the conviction questioned there. The 
remoteness of the prior convictions was significant there and is 
even more so here. Under Rule 609(b) Mr. Howland's prior 
convictions would be inadmissible except that the period of 
incarceration is tolled. Even considering the period Mr. Howland 
served, he shows a seven year span (from 1979 to 1986) from the two 
convictions and the one now being appealed. Seven years is a 
substantial period of time and tips the balancing in favor of 
excluding the prior convictions. 
Attempted robbery and attempted burglary are both 
considered crimes of violence as outlined by Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-501(2)(e) and various other sections of the Code. Aggravated 
Assault is also a crime of violence and as such would indicate the 
need to exclude the prior convictions. As crimes of violence the 
new charge was substantially similar to the prior crimes and could 
have lead the jury to punish Mr. Howland as a bad and violent 
person. This factor requires balancing in favor of excluding the 
prior convictions as well. 
The importance of credibility issues in determining what 
occurred in this case is paramount. The story of what happened 
between Mr. Howland and Mr. Elliston depends primarily upon the 
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credibility of each witness. By ruling as 
of Mr. Howland's prior convictions while ex 
Elliston's prior convictions, the trial cou 
balance in favor of the state in determinin 
it did to allow evidence 
eluding evidence of Mr. 
rt unfairly tipped the 
g the credibility of 
Howland's testimony as opposed to that of Mr. Elliston. 
Mr. Howland's testimony was import ant and essential since 
it explained the altercation between the two men as he saw it. 
Because of the importance of Howland's test 
between probative value and prejudicial effl 
towards exclusion of the prior convictions. 
imony, the balance 
ect should have shifted 
out in State v. Banner, 
ng the court that "the 
controlled the question 
As the Utah Supreme Court pointed 
supra, the State has the burden of persuadii 
probative value of admitting the convictions, as far as shedding 
light on the defendant's credibility, outweighs the prejudicial 
effect to the defendant." Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334. As was the 
case in Banner, in the present case, the state offered little 
evidence that the convictions were more probative than prejudicial. 
The State contended that Subsection (a)(2) 
as to whether Mr. Howland's prior convictions were admissible. The 
prosecutor stated: "We need not determine|whether there is more 
probative or more prejudicial" (R. 251). 
The prosecutor then stated: 
If the Court is inclined to look ^t it 
differently, I would suggest to the Court that 
even if one were to apply, and I suggest one 
certainly need not do that in this instance, the 
balancing test, that the jury has the right to 
know and that this is sufficiently probative that 
it outweighs any prejudicial effept. (R. 251). 
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Thereafter/ the prosecutor cited several Utah cases which 
were decided prior to Utah's adoption of Rule 609(a). In State v. 
Banner/ supraf the state relied on the same cases cited by the State 
in the present case.2 in that casef the Utah Supreme Court pointed 
out that the new Rules of Evidence "are to provide a fresh starting 
place for the law of evidence in this state. 'Since the advisory 
committee generally sought to achieve uniformity between Utah's 
rules and the federal rulesr this Court looks to the interpretations 
of the federal rules by the federal courts to aid in interpreting 
the Utah rules.' Since Rule 609 is the federal rule verbatim/ and 
in light of the construction objections just noted/ we turn to the 
federal decisions interpreting the rule to aid in deciding this 
case." State v. Banner/ supra at 1333-4. To the extent that prior 
opinions are inconsistent with Rule 609, they are overruled. 
Banner, supra at 1334 n. 40. 
Hence the State did not sustain its burden under Rule 609 
(a)(1) of proving that evidence of Mr. Howland's prior convictions 
was more probative than prejudicial. 
In addition, the trial court's ruling failed to clearly 
disclose not only under which subsection of 609(a) it was rulingf 
but also failed to make explicit findings as to the basis of any 
2
 The state cited State v. McCumber/ 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980); State 
v. Harless/ 459 P.2d 210 (Utah 1969); State v. Bennett/ 517 P.2d 
1029 (Utah 1973); and Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); all 
of which were argued by the State in Banner. This Court commented 
on the use of the pre-Rule 609 cases stating: "It is particularly 
significant that the prosecutor at argument on defendant's motion 
below relied upon case law established prior to our adoption of Rule 
609(a)." Banner/ 717 P.2d at 1334 n. 45. 
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decision that the probative value of the convictions outweighed the 
prejudicial effect of such convictions, Su 
explicit findings amounted to a failure to 
discretion given the trial court under Rulel 
the Banner Court pointed out: 
ch failure to make 
(properly exercise the 
609(a)* In footnote 43, 
Our determination makes it unnecessary to address 
whether the lack of explicit findings on the 
record implies a failure to exercise the 
discretion conferred upon the tri^l court by Rule 
609 or whether the trial court must provide an 
on-the-record explanation of its Rule 609 
findings. 
State v, Banner, supra at 1334. 
The footnote further pointed out that in United States v. 
Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the ctourt stated that "it must 
be obvious to any careful trial judge that an explicit finding in 
the terms of the Rule can be of great utility, if indeed not 
required, on appellate review." Id. at 356 n. 17 (citations 
omitted). The trial court failed to outline any findings which 
justified an (a)(1) ruling. 
Because the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions 
outweighed their probative effect and base£ on the state's failure 
to sustain its burden of showing otherwise and the trial court's 
failure to outline explicit findings under Rule 609(a), Mr. 
Howland's prior convictions should not havte been admitted under 
609(a)(1). 
B. MR. HOWLAND'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE NOT CRIMES 
WHICH INVOLVED DISHONESTY OR FALSE STATEMENT 
AS MEANT BY RULE 609(a)(2). 
Rule 609(a)(2) concerns impeachmelnt by prior convictions 
for offenses involving dishonesty or false statement. The Utah 
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Supreme Court has yet to address what crimes qualify as crimes of 
dishonesty or false statement since adopting the new rules and 
beginning the "fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this 
state." State v. Banner/ supra at 1333 (Utah 1986). However, as 
the Utah rule is a verbatim replica of the federal rule, ample 
federal case law exists to act as a guide. 
The federal courts are not in complete agreement on what 
constitutes "dishonesty or false statement,"3 but the better 
reasoned cases strongly indicate that the attempted robbery and 
attempted burglary convictions of Mr. Howland should not have been 
admissible at trial. In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976), which the Utah Supreme Court cited in its recent 
609(a)(1) State v. Banner decision, the circuit court discussed in 
detail the legislative history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the 
heated debate which spawned the formulation of the rule. The Smith 
court quoted the Conference Committee Report which stated: 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" 
the Conference means crimes such as perjury or 
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal 
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any 
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the 
commission of which involves some element of 
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing 
on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. 
United States v. Smith, supra at 362, (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News, pp. 6098, 7103). Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion 
discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding that 
3
 See generally, annot. Rule 609(a)(2): Convictions Admissible; 
Crimes Involving Dishonesty, 39 ALR Fed. 596 §15. 
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crimes of the type that Mr. Howland previously had been convicted of 
committing would not qualify under the crimen falsi designation. 
United States v. Smith, supra at 362-63. 
Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light on 
what Congress* intent was with regards to Rule 609(a)(2). In a 
statement from the court in United States v[. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior convictions 
of Mr. Howland, the court reasoned: 
An intent to deceive or defraud is 
element of either offense . . . . 
cannot say that either offense, inl 
of the Conference Committee, is "peculiarly 
not an 
(Certainly we 
the language 
probative of credibility." Althouj 
argued that any willful violation 
evinces a lack of character and a 
all legal duties, including the obligations of 
an oath, Congress has not accepted 
expansive theory. 
gh it may be 
of law. . . 
disregard for 
that 
Otherwise, one could 
crime could be introduced 
United States v. Millings, supra at 123. The clear intent of 
Congress was to limit the introduction of prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes only to those crimes vfhich bear directly on a 
witness1 propensity to not tell the truth. 
argue, as discounted in Millings, that any 
to impeach. As the Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress 
did not intend to adopt such an expanded position. 
In United States v. Glenn, 667 F.£d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), 
the court held that the crimes of burglary 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a ^howing of accompanying 
fraudulent or deceitful conduct. The burden rests with the State to 
make such a showing. Generally, the court observed that crimes of 
violence, theft crimes, and crimes of stealth (as in the case at 
and grand theft were not 
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bar) do not involve dishonesty or false statement within the proper 
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). 
In United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 
1978)f the court stated that dishonesty and false statement does not 
include convictions for burglary or robbery (in the case at bar the 
convictions are for attempted burglary and attempted robbery) since 
the terms are used in a restrictive manner and are limited to those 
prior convictions which manifest deceit/ untruthfulness, or 
falsification which would demonstrate that the accused would be 
likely to testify untruthfully. 
Similarly/ the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction 
for felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's 
propensity to testify truthfully. The court stated that felony 
theft does not involve dishonesty or false statement of the 
credibility—deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609 (a)(2). 
Howard v. Gonzalesf 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Mr. Howland's prior convictions do not demonstrate a 
propensity to lie under oath. They show no deceit or dishonesty as 
contemplated by Congress in promulgating Rule 609(a)(2). 
Accordingly/ the trial court committed reversible error in denying 
the motion to exclude the convictions. The conviction of Mr. 
Howland for attempted aggravated assault should be reversed and the 
case remanded back to the trial court for a new trial without the 
admission of Mr. Howland's prior convictions. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE IMPEACHMENT OF MR. ELLISTON 
BY HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
Subsequent to denying Mr. Howland'is motion to exclude his 
prior convictions, the trial court excluded the prior convictions of 
the McDonalds employee, Mr. Elliston (R. 145-46). Mr. Elliston's 
prior record included a 1985 conviction for attempted burglary, a 
Class A misdemeanor (R. 259, 275). The trial court's decision to 
exclude the convictions of Mr. Elliston was inconsistent with its 
decision regarding Mr. Howland's motion, was erroneous in and of 
itself, and further prejudiced Mr. Howland 
constitutional rights of due process and a 
violating his 
fair trial as guaranteed 
by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Sections Seven[and Twelve of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Almost immediately after the trial court ruled that Mr. 
Howlandfs prior convictions were admissible, apparently under the 
609(a)(2) theory of dishonesty and false statement, defense counsel 
called Mr. Elliston to the stand and attempted to impeach him by r introducing his prior convictions (R. 259). The State objected to 
the questioning and then a discussion off the record at the bench 
ensued between the court and counsel (R. 259). The trial court 
). Later in the case the 
the subsequent discussion 
ultimately sustained the objection (R. 259[ 
trial court raised the question again and 
revealed the contents of the earlier side (bar discussion (R. 273-83) 
Defense counsel stated: 
That was my argument at the bench, Your Honor, in 
regard to Mr. Elliston's conviction, that if the 
Court concludes that a burglary i|s a crime of 
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dishonesty then it doesnft matter whether it is a 
felony or misdemeanor. And the fact that his 
conviction is for a Class A misdemeanor does not 
make it inadmissible. 
(R. 275). The two attorneys then restated their respective 
positions (R. 275-82), and ultimately Judge Wilkinson ruled, stating: 
Well, the Court is going to rule. The Court is 
not going to allow you to go into it. I think 
that the law, this Cintron case, does allow it. 
But I am going to have to abide by the rules, and 
sometimes they are technical. If the State had 
not rested their case then I would allow it. But 
with the State having rested their case I don't 
think that I can allow you to bring that witness 
back as your own witness and impeach. As I say, 
it was still open, then it would be something 
else. So that is the way I am going to rule. 
(R. 282-83). 
The trial court's ruling that the state has rested its case 
thereby preventing defense counsel from calling Mr. Elliston as her 
own witness is erroneous. Such a ruling violates a basic 
fundamental constitutional provision. The rights of an accused in a 
criminal trial to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call 
witnesses in his own behalf are essential to due process and a fair 
trial. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). A defendant 
may always call a State's witness as his own; he is entitled to do 
so and at times even required—such as when the inquiry is beyond 
the scope of the direct exam. See McCormick on evidence §26 (3d ed. 
1984). Once a party calls a witness, the party may impeach that 
witness. Rule 607 of the Utah Rules of Evidence addresses this 
question and states: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked 
by any party, including the party calling him." 
Moreover, the ruling of the trial court unfairly prejudiced 
Mr. Howland in that the same legal basis—albeit error—allowed in 
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his prior convictions but was not utilized to impeach the 
credibility of Mr. Elliston. The effect of the erroneous ruling was 
to put before the jury a defendant with prior convictions telling 
his story against the story of the State's witness appearing beyond 
reproach though equally flawed with prior convictions. 
A jury faced with making a determination of guilt or 
innocence, is likely to favor the version of the person who stands 
unblemished before them. In this case, thej 
court prejudiced Mr. Howland as his blemish 
ruling of the trial 
was exposed to the jury 
while the blemish of Mr. Elliston was inappropriately excluded. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the prejudicial ruling of the 
trial court and place both witnesses on equal footing before the 
jury. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS THE CHARGE OE AG' GRAVATED ASSAULT. 
After the State concluded its case, Mr. Howland moved the 
trial court to dismiss the charge of aggravated assault (R. 242). 
The trial court denied the motion (R. 245-46). Mr. Howland now 
contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it 
denied that motion because the State had failed to present a prima 
facie case. 
To present a prima facie case of Aggravated assault the 
State must prove each element of the crime^4 Utah Code Ann. 
4
 Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended) sets forth the standard 
for conviction in criminal cases. That section provides: "A 
defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be 
acquitted." 
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§76-5-103 outlines the crime of aggravated assault and identifies 
the requisite elements; it reads: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means 
or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 lists the elements of assault as: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another. 
Since no one sustained serious bodily injury in this case, the 
State's prima facie case must show evidence of a threat accompanied 
by an immediate show of force or violence and the use of a deadly 
weapon as part of that assault. 
According to the prosecution witnesses, the alleged threat 
occurred near the dumpster and consisted of a statement that in the 
future, Mr. Howland would harm Mr. Elliston's family. Such a threat 
did not suggest that Mr. Howland intended to do any harm to Mr. 
Elliston at that time. 
After Mr. Howland allegedly made the threat, a scuffle 
between Mr. Elliston and Mr. Howland ensued. Mr. Elliston testified 
that Mr. Howland made a motion "like he was going to hit me, and so 
I hit him" (R. 167). Mr. Elliston also testified that he struck Mr. 
Howland in the face before Mr. Howland could hit him and that Mr. 
Howland actually never made contact with Mr. Elliston despite Mr. 
Elliston hitting Mr. Howland four or five times in the face (R. 
- 26 -
the dumpster from any 
183-84). The State later admitted that Mr.lElliston actually had 
taken the offensive position after Mr. Howland made a fist and 
pulled it back to strike Mr. Elliston (R. 243). 
Mr. Howland did not use a weapon at the dumpster and, in 
fact retreated from the situation after being struck in the face 
four or five times, thereby clarifying that he did not intend to 
carry out any action which Mr. Elliston might have perceived as a 
threat (R. 50-52). By running away from the situation, Mr. Howland 
attenuated his statement and the scuffle at 
subsequent activity. Mr. Howland was twenty feet away from the 
dumpster before Mr. Elliston started to follow him (R. 189). While 
Mr. Elliston claimed that he feared Mr. Howland was going after his 
family, he acknowledged that Mr. Howland had no idea where his 
family lived (R. 45-46). Hence, Mr. Howland's action in running 
from the dumpster established that the perdeived threat and scuffle 
at the dumpster were distinct and separate (from the incident in 
front of Smith's. 
After Mr. Howland ran from the dunjpster area, Mr. Elliston 
instigated phase two. Mr. Elliston chased 
from behind, placed him in a headlock, and 
ground (R. 189-90). Mr. Kilburn approached the pair and saw Mr. 
Howland who Mr. Elliston was holding in a headlock, with his hand on 
a knife in its sheath (R. 211-12). Mr. Ki][l 
arm. While Kilburn claimed that the knife 
that time, Howland testified that the knif£ was still in the sheath 
and that when Kilburn grabbed his arm, the 
sheath (R. 270-272). Howland did not make 
Mr. Howland, grabbed him 
wrestled him to the 
burn grabbed Howland's 
was out of the sheath at 
knife came out of the 
a motion to use the knife 
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(R. 217-18). Elliston was unaware until after the altercation ended 
that Mr. Howland had a knife (R. 192). The State attempted to 
establish that Mr. Howland was the perpetrator of an aggravated 
assault by combining the events. The prosecutor argued, "It is 
still an aggravated assault because there is a threat accompanied by 
a show of force or violence. The mere fact of the fist and pulling 
the arm back together with the use of the deadly weapon" (R. 244). 
In one sentence the state attempted to bootstrap the events by the 
dumpster to the grabbing of the knife by the witness. 
The removal of the knife in an upward motion was not done 
in the immediate time and space of any perceived threat and was 
sufficiently attenuated from the alleged threat by Mr. Howland's 
retreat that it cannot be bootstrapped to that threat to make the 
combined incident an aggravated assault. At the time Mr. Howland 
reached for the knife, he had been hit in the face five times 
without sustaining one blow against Mr. Elliston, chased after 
running from the dumpster, kneed, and held in a headlock. As 
previously argued, even if Mr. Elliston was attempting to effectuate 
a citizen's arrest as he claimed, that arrest was unlawful and he 
was using excessive force in carrying it out. Mr. Howland reached 
for the knife in a defensive reaction to an unlawful arrest and 
excessive use of force. The withdrawal from the dumpster area by 
Mr. Howland and his running away, as well as the lapse in time and 
span of distance, prohibited an interpretation that a threat was 
authored and accompanied by an "immediate" show of force and use of 
a deadly weapon as required by the statute. 
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Accordingly, the trial court should have granted Mr. 
Howland's motion to dismiss the charge. The trial court committed 
reversible error when it denied that motion and this Court should 
therefore reverse the lower court's decision and remand with 
instructions to dismiss the charges. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO FLIGHT 
AFTER THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME. 
At the close of the evidence, the [trial court gave the jury 
the following instruction: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
Intentional flight by a defendant 
immediately after the commission of a crime is 
not sufficient in itself to establish guilt; but 
is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by 
the jury in the light of all other evidence in 
the case in determining guilt or ijnnocence. 
Whether or not evidence of flightjshows a 
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if 
any, to be attached to any such evidence are 
matters exclusively within the province of the 
jury. 
Defense counsel objected to such instruction (R. 337), 
instruction was not based on evidence introduced at trial, was 
misleading to the jury and served as a comment on the evidence. 
Instructions given to the jury mu^t be based on the 
evidence introduced at trial. See State vj. Pacheco, 495 P.2d 808 
The 
(Utah 1972); State v. Marasco, 17 P.2d 919 
State v. Wrenn, 584 P.2d 1231 (Idaho 1978) 
found that the departure of the defendants 
flight, but rather is consistent with the tact the defendants were 
transients." That court stated: 
|, 923-24 (Utah 1933). In 
|, the Idaho Supreme Court 
was not "indicative of 
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For departure to take on the legal significance 
of flight, there must be other circumstances 
present and unexplained which, together with the 
departure reasonably justify an inference that it 
was done with a consciousness of guilt and in an 
effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution based 
on that guilt. Id. at 1234. 
That Court held that giving a flight instruction was erroneous and 
reversed the case. 
In the present case, the evidence did not support the 
giving of a flight instruction. Assuming, arguendo, that an 
attempted aggravated assault occurred, it did not occur until the 
knife was pulled from its sheath. Howland was restrained at that 
time and subsequently arrested. No flight or departure occurred 
after the knife was pulled. 
The only departure or "flight" in this case occurred when 
Mr. Howland ran from the dumpster area. As previously outlined, the 
only violation which had possibly occurred at that time was a 
trespass, a violation which was not charged or presented to the 
jury. Although arguably flight might be considered in determining 
whether Mr. Howland committed a trespass or any other crime at the 
dumpster, it was irrelevant to the issue of whether he committed an 
aggravated assault. Instructing the jury in this manner served to 
confuse rather than clarify for the jury since no "flight" in the 
legal sense occurred after the alleged commission of the offense 
charged. 
In addition, instructing the jury in this manner suggested 
that a "flight" rather than a retreat from the situation occurred. 
Mr. Howland did exactly as Mr. Elliston requested and retreated from 
the dumpster area. Howland's retreat was a reasonable, positive 
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response to the situation at the dumpster. The Court's instruction 
on flight takes this reasonable/ positive a 
situation and twists it into a negative act 
let of retreating from the 
ion to be considered in 
determining whether Mr. Howland committed aln aggravated assault. 
ury's attention to an act 
Mr. Howland committed an 
The instruction focuses on and alerts the j 
which is irrelevant in determining whether 
aggravated assault since any alleged aggravated assault did not 
occur until after Mr. Howland retreated frqm the dumpster area. 
Flight instructions are disfavored in many jurisdictions 
and have been subject to controversy and conflicting opinions as to 
24 P.2d 248/ 251 (Wash. 
889 (Colo. App. 1984); 
The basic argument 
that they serve as 
Jefferson/ supra at 251; 
their propriety. See State v. Jeffersony 5 
App. 1974); People v. Rogers, 690 P.2d 886,| 
State v. Wrenn, 584 P.2d 1231 (Id. 1978). 
against flight instructions in general/ is 
improper comment on the evidence. State v^ 
People v. Rogers, supra at 889. 
As the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in State v. Balesy 
675 P.2d 572 (Utah 1983)/ flight instructions have been subject to 
controversy and differing opinions among various jurisdictions. In 
that casef the Court pointed out that "(a)jthough our cases affirm 
the admissibility of evidence of flight (citations omitted)/ the 
circumstances that will support a jury instruction on flight and the 
content of such an instruction present questions not yet answered by 
this Court." 
I n
 Bales/ the Court found that th&re was evidence to 
justify a flight instruction and that the first paragraph of the 
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instruction given was acceptable but "(i)t should. . . have been 
incorporated two further ideas" State v. Bales, supra at 575. 
A flight instruction will not be completely free 
from criticism unless it advises the jury that 
there may be reasons for flight fully consistent 
with innocence and that even if consciousness of 
guilt is inferred from flight it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime 
charged. 
State v. Bales, supra at 575. 
The Court rejected the second paragraph of the flight 
instruction based on its assertion that flight constitutes an 
implied admission of guilt. 
The instruction given in this case was similar to that 
approved in State v. Gonzales, 517 P.2d 547 (Utah 1973). However, 
it did not expressly "advise the jury that there may be reasons for 
flight fully consistent with innocence" or that "even if 
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged" State v. 
Bales, supra at 575. In light of the above requirements set forth in 
Bales, Mr. Howland urges this Court to reject the content of the 
instruction given, even though substantially similar to that in 
Gonzales, since it did not clarify for the jury that other reasons 
for flight may exist or that flight does not necessarily reflect 
guilt of the crime charged. 
Such additional ideas are especially important in this case 
where no evidence of departure occurred after the knife was pulled 
from its sheath; as previously outlined the only departure occurred 
when Mr. Howland retreated from the dumpster. The reason for such 
retreat could be response to Mr. Elliston's request he leave, an 
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attempt to get away from the swinging arms of Elliston or various 
other reasons. As the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Bales, the 
Court should have instructed the jury that other reasons for 
departure may exist. 
been advised that flight 
[rime charged. As 
lation at the dumpster was 
In addition, the jury should have 
does not necessarily reflect guilt of the cli 
previously outlined, the only possible viol< 
an infraction trespass. By not advising the jury that if a flight 
occurred it did not necessarily reflect consciousness of guilt of 
the crime charged, the instruction could confuse the jury into 
thinking that if it decided Mr. Howland ran because he felt guilty, 
that feeling of guilt would suggest he committed an aggravated 
assault rather than some other crime. Thi^ clarification was 
necessary in this case where any flight or departure occurred prior 
to the crime alleged in the information. 
The trial court committed reversible error in giving 
Instruction No. 22 to the jury. Where there is no evidence on which 
to base a flight instruction and the jury could have determined as a 
result of that instruction that the defendant's departure was a 
flight and evidence of guilt, giving the instruction amounts to 
reversible error. See State v. Wrenn, suppa at 1234. Gallegos v. 
People, 444 P.2d 267, 270 (Colo. 1968). 
In State v. Pacheco, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the trial court committed reversible error where the Court gave 
the jury an instruction on aiding and abetting even though there was 
no evidence of aiding and abetting. The qacheco Court stated that 
it: 
- 33 -
seems almost axiomatic that instructions must 
bear a relationship to evidence reflected in the 
record, and we cannot enjoy the luxury of 
sustaining a conviction on trite aphorism 
unsupported by any kind of evidence. 
In State v. Bales, supra at 576, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that giving a flight instruction where the content of the 
second paragraph was improper did not constitute reversible error 
because the magnitude of the other evidence "provided an ample basis 
for conviction". In that case, unlike the present case, the Court 
found that there was evidence which justified the Court giving a 
flight instruction. 
In the present case, as previously outlined, the evidence 
did not justify a flight instruction. Because the instruction was 
given, the jury could have concluded that a flight rather than a 
departure occurred and used that determination in assessing Mr. 
Howland's guilt as to the crime charged. As previously outlined 
flight instructions in general are disfavored because they draw 
attention to the act and serve as a comment on the evidence. In the 
present case, where jury confusion could easily arise due to the 
attenuation between the incident at the dumpster and the scuffle in 
front of Smithfs, the flight instruction drew the two incidents 
together, and suggested that Mr. Howland did something improper in 
retreating from the dumpster area. This instruction, coupled with 
the jury's knowledge that Mr. Howland had a prior conviction (and 
their lack of knowledge as to Elliston's prior conviction) suggested 
that Mr. Howland had committed a crime in this instance. 
In addition, because of the attenuation between the 
incident at the dumpster and the incident in front of Smith's, and 
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the differing versions testified to by Elli^ton and Howland, very 
little evidence that Mr. Howland committed an aggravated assault 
existed. Accordingly, the trial court commlltted reversible error : 
giving this specific flight instruction where the evidence did not 
support a flight instruction. 
POINT V. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
COMMITTED AT TRIAL PREJUDICED MR. HOWLAND 
SO AS TO DENY HIM A FAIR 
Even if this Court finds that none| 
individually require reversal/ the cumulati 
THE ERRORS 
TRIAL. 
of the above errors 
ve effect of the errors 
so prejudiced Mr. Howland's right to a fair trial that the 
conviction should be reversed. In Gooden v 
250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) the court stated: 
. State, 617 P.2d 248, 
When a review of the entire recorq 
numerous irregularities that tend 
the rights of a defendant and wheij 
accumulation of errors denies a dQ 
trial, the case will be reversed, 
of the errors standing alone, wou][d not be ample 
to justify reversal. 
(citation omitted). See also State v. St. 
reveals 
to prejudice 
e an 
fendant a fair 
even though one 
Clair, 282 P.2d 323 (Utah 
1955). The errors committed at trial demonstrate that Mr. Howland 
did not receive a fair trial; accordingly, this Court should find 
that the accumulation of errors warrant a reversal of Mr. Howland's 
conviction, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
As previously outlined, the erroneous admission of evidence 
of Mr. Howland's prior convictions coupledj 
Mr. Elliston's prior convictions left the 
that Mr. Howland was less credible than MrL 
impression, coupled with a flight instruct 
with the failure to admit 
[jury with the impression 
. Elliston. This 
[ion which suggests that 
Mr. Howland did something negative in retreating from the situation, 
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further suggested that Mr. Howland did something wrong in this 
situation. These errors, coupled with the additional errors set 
forth above, denied Mr. Howland his right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
James R. Howland, requests this Court to reverse his conviction for 
aggravated robbery and remand this case to the trial court with an 
order for either dismissal of the charges or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this <£6 day of June, 1987. 
LISA J. R£MAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LISA J. REMAL, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Guilding;, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this ?S day of June, 1987. 
LISA J. kEMAL 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED by this day of 
June, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL] 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTYi STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DisjjrjRICT (COURT 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFiCc 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
ric 
V  
1241986 
Clerk 3rd Di3i Cc 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) TO 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
i 
Defendant. 
Case Noj 
Count N4 
Honorab e 
Clerk _ j 
Reporter] 
Bailiff 
Date . 
HOMER F, WILKINSON 
G A CHtLDS 
• The motion of. 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. Th 
should not be imposed, and defenda 
of no contest; of the offense of 
a rj^ss r*j rp$demearjpr, being now pr< 
At AN SMITH 
otjbivFm? 
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
r reason why sentence 
plea ofjgu£lfy;D plea 
ready fj 
, and the State being represented py 
ve offense, 
jntenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
. months; A r -• j, 
'and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of %o<*!VU ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ .to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
XTDeU (detail) si fendant is granted a stay of the above iFj i entence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision pj^he^Chj^fAgent, Utah Stajte Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the period of (FYUf^ 
D Defendant is remanded into the^custody of the Sheriff of Skit Lake County, to be confined and 
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with thi|s Judgment and Commitment. 
• Commitment shall issue 
DATED th is^SZl day of fJtfc?* 
are hereby dismissed. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
_ 19-2& 
#-^i^g/S<-
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
1 * 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page JLO,$=Z 
a*s 0G0G 9 t 
(White—Court) (Green—Judge) (Yellow—Jail/Pnson/AP&P) (Pink—Defense) (Goldenrod—State) 
Judgment/State v. 
XZt'yius 
C ^ ^ i U ^ C ^ 7 4 i ^ t m L ^ H o n o r a b l e UJ'<Md*U*> 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
fual and 
te^Serve 
dinarv condtjlorts required by the Dept. of Adult Probation 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing 
D Pay a fine in the amount of $ D at a rate, 
Parole; or Q at the rate of 
e determined by the Depa 
; or D in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adi 
; or • at a rate to be determined by 
D Pay restitution in the amount of $ 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of 
Jtne Department of Adult Probation and Par$&S J J 
y Enter, participate in, and complete any sUWldAr-
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any • educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D'with 
program, counseling, or treatment as 
Participate in and complete any. 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
. training • as directed by the Department of Adult 
Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
• Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
to Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with I 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
i n d Parole ^ %-
n Complete l^r hours of community service restitution in lieu of ^ ^ days in jail. 
• Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review of this sentence. 
Page - ^ L O f D 
jpOLWTyJUDGE 
g T AH-o-xoN^D^r 
Deputy CtorK 
ADDENDUM B 
LISA J. REMAL (2722) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
SaJt Lake County, Utah 
SEP & * 1986 
H D ixoMjU^^«fk3rdOi8 t Court 
By D*ontv Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES R. HOWLAND, 
Defendant. 
MOTION 
NOTICE 
TO DISMISS AND 
OF HEARING 
Case Nol. CR86-1056 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
MOTION 
and through his 
s Court to dismiss 
on the following 
COMES NOW the Defendant above-named, by 
attorney, LISA J. REMAL, and hereby moves this 
the above-entitled case against the defendant 
grounds: 
That the defendant's arrest was in violation of his constitutional 
rights under the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The basis for this 
claim is the defendant's belief that the citizen who placed the 
defendant under citizen's arrest had either rio basis for said arrest 
or at most, was placing the defendant under arrest for an infraction, 
a category of offense for which no jail can be imposed and, therefore, 
no arrest can be made. The defendant, therefore, had a right to 
resist the unlawful arrest. 
DATED this ?L day of September, 1986 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
^Q. fcwj f 
LISA J./REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above-entitled 
matter will come on regularly for hearing on the day of 
, 1986, at the hour of .m., before 
the Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON. 
DATED this ZC day of September, 1986. 
J\fyL^\.knstl 
LISA J. REMAL 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Notice 
of Hearing to the Office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this £(, day of September 
J 
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ADDENDUM C 
76-8-305. Interference with peace officer making lawful 
arrest. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if helhas knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or another and inter-
feres with such arrest or detention by use of force [or by use of any weapon. 
